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As the United States–Israel war against Iran enters its third week and continues to spill across the region, the question is no longer who will win but how this conflict might end. Each round of retaliation deepens a cycle that threatens to pull the wider Middle East into prolonged instability. Yet even the most entrenched wars eventually give way to negotiation. The challenge is recognising the moment when continuing the fight becomes more costly than stepping back.
Earlier this week, Iran once again denied responsibility for recent attacks on civilian infrastructure in the Gulf and proposed forming a joint committee with regional states to investigate the incidents. Tehran suggested that a cooperative mechanism involving Gulf countries could clarify what happened and determine responsibility. Whether such a proposal is sincere or simply tactical is another matter. Iran has repeatedly insisted that its war is with the US and Israel, not with its Gulf neighbours. But continued missile and drone attacks across the region have heightened suspicion. Any Iranian claim will be scrutinised carefully, if not outright rejected.
Still, Gulf states understand better than most that this war is not in their interest. It is not a conflict of their choosing, and they have been careful not to become direct participants so far. Their response has largely been limited to condemning Iran’s “indiscriminate and reckless strikes targeting sovereign territory and endangering civilian populations”, while focusing on defensive measures such as air defence operations. That restraint is not accidental. Gulf leaders know that a direct confrontation with Iran – a country of more than 90 million people with substantial military capabilities – could quickly spiral into a long and destructive regional war. The memory of the Iran–Iraq War in the 1980s still looms large across the Gulf, a reminder of how quickly such conflicts can drag on for years and reshape the region.
There is also a deeper anxiety at play. Gulf capitals see little clarity in Washington about what the endgame of this war might be. At the same time, they are acutely aware that the conflict reflects the strategic priorities of Israel’s leadership under Benjamin Netanyahu. The concern in many Gulf capitals is that, if the war widens, they may be left carrying much of the burden. From their perspective, escalation could leave them exposed while others move on to different theatres. Indeed, Israel has already begun shifting attention towards Lebanon, long a central front in its military planning. The unresolved challenge of Hezbollah and longstanding ambitions to occupy the area south of the Litani River continue to shape its strategy.
Against this backdrop, while Iran “sees no reason to negotiate with the US”, its proposal for a joint investigative mechanism still offers a narrow but meaningful opening for regional de-escalation. Gulf states may decide that cautiously exploring dialogue with Tehran, even if only at a technical level, could help prevent further destabilisation in their immediate neighbourhood. Their willingness to consider such engagement may also reflect the complex intelligence landscape that has emerged in the region. Since October 7, 2023, there has been growing recognition of the extraordinary reach of Israel’s intelligence services and their ability to operate across borders, including inside Iran itself. Israel’s decision to strike the South Pars gasfield (the world’s largest gas reserve, jointly shared between Iran and Qatar) on March 18, despite its clear regional and global economic significance, underscores the extent to which it may be willing to act in ways that risk drawing Gulf states more directly into the conflict. In such an environment, determining responsibility for attacks is rarely straightforward. A joint or independent investigation could therefore serve as a practical first step towards de-escalation.
This war is unlikely to produce a decisive military victory. Nor is it likely to evolve into a comprehensive peace process any time soon. The most realistic objective in the near term is a ceasefire.
Historically, ceasefires emerge when all sides reach the same conclusion: that continuing the war will cost more than ending it. But for a ceasefire to hold, each side must also be able to claim some measure of success. In practice, that means crafting an outcome that allows all parties to save face at home while quietly stepping back from escalation.
The most plausible path forward begins with phased de-escalation rather than a sweeping political agreement. In practical terms, an initial phase could focus on halting attacks on Gulf states and civilian infrastructure, alongside clear assurances that Gulf territory will not be used as a launch platform for strikes on Iran. For such an arrangement to work, Gulf governments would need to insist that the United States refrain from using its regional bases to launch further attacks on Iranian territory. At the same time, Iran would need to halt attacks on maritime shipping and energy infrastructure. Securing the Strait of Hormuz would create strong incentives for international actors, from Europe to Asia, to support and, where possible, enforce a ceasefire.
A second phase could then focus on ending the direct exchange of strikes between Iran and Israel. At that stage, political narratives will matter almost as much as the military realities. For Israel and the United States, leaders will likely argue that their operations succeeded in degrading Iran’s nuclear and missile capabilities and imposing significant strategic costs. They may also frame the decision to halt escalation as a deliberate choice aimed at sparing civilian lives. Presented in this way, stopping the campaign would not appear as a retreat but rather as the successful completion of a limited military objective.
Iran, meanwhile, would frame the outcome very differently. Tehran would emphasise resilience, arguing that the Islamic republic survived intense military pressure and that attempts to destabilise the regime failed. Iranian leaders would likely claim that their response to the assassination of their supreme leader and the imposed war restored deterrence and forced their adversaries to reconsider the risks of further confrontation.
These narratives may clash, but they are not unusual in war. Many wars end in precisely this way: not with a clear victor, but with an arrangement that allows each side to claim it achieved its core goals.
Direct negotiations between Iran and its primary adversaries remain politically fraught and difficult to sustain. In such circumstances, and given the recent history of misuse of negotiations hosted in the region, progress will require the involvement of a major external power capable of exerting influence on multiple sides at once. China appears well positioned to play such a role. Beijing has cultivated strong economic and diplomatic relationships across the Middle East, maintaining working ties with Iran, the Gulf states and Israel alike. Its growing political weight, combined with its interest in protecting the stability of global energy markets, gives it both the incentive and the leverage to encourage de-escalation.
China has already demonstrated its ability to mediate regional disputes. In March 2023, Beijing brokered a landmark agreement that restored diplomatic relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran after a seven-year rupture, leading to the reopening of embassies and the resumption of formal ties. High-level engagement between Washington and Beijing as part of preparations for President Donald Trump’s scheduled trip to China, recently delayed until late April due to the Iran war, could create a rare opportunity for quiet great-power coordination aimed at preventing a wider regional war. Despite their strategic rivalry, both powers share a clear interest in avoiding a conflict that could destabilise global markets, disrupt energy supplies and deepen geopolitical uncertainty.
Regional actors, particularly Saudi Arabia and Turkiye, would still play an important supporting role in encouraging China to become involved. Countries such as Oman and Qatar have long served as discreet conduits for dialogue, capable of hosting back-channel discussions and maintaining communication when formal negotiations stall. European governments and international institutions could complement these efforts by coordinating economic incentives or sanctions relief as part of a broader diplomatic package.
The most difficult challenge will be addressing the security concerns on all sides. Iran has long demanded that security in the Gulf be managed by regional states themselves. Israel and its partners, in turn, insist on credible guarantees that Iranian military capabilities will not threaten their security. Bridging this divide will require sustained, careful diplomacy and patience.
What is certain is that this war will not end through maximalist demands or decisive battlefield triumphs. It will end when leaders recognise that prolonging the conflict serves no one’s long-term interests.
The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Al Jazeera’s editorial stance.
